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Abstract - Studies have suggested that formal specifications 
and lightweight formal methods help improve the clarity 
and precision of the requirements specification. This paper 
describes a process to augment the current informal 
approaches to system-of-systems development by 
introducing temporal assertions to capture the safety-
critical and mission-essential system requirements and 
runtime model checking to evaluate the system designs and 
implementation. The process allows users to develop and 
validate temporal assertions iteratively via simulation with 
multiple scenarios, and to use the assertions to automate 
the testing of the system-of-systems under development as 
well as armor-plating the target system against any 
unexpected behaviors at runtime. 
Keywords: Formal specification, temporal assertion, 
prototyping, run-time execution monitoring. 
1 Introduction 
  We define a system-of-systems (SoS) as a federation 
of existing systems and developing systems that provide an 
enhanced capability greater than that of any of the 
individual systems within the system-of-systems. The 
individual systems making up of a system-of-systems are 
often developed for a different context and subjected to a 
different set of constraints than those of the system-of-
systems. The development of complex systems-of-systems 
poses many challenges [1,2]. These systems are very 
complex (often distributed, heterogeneous, network-centric, 
and software intensive) and yet have to be highly 
dependable. Feasible timing and safety requirements for 
these systems are difficult to understand, formulate and 
satisfy. There is a growing interest in using object-oriented 
analysis and design methods in conjunction with the 
Unified Modeling Language (UML) to develop complex 
systems-of-systems [3]. These methods usually start with 
Use Case analysis to identify user needs. Functional and 
non-functional requirements obtained from the Use Case 
analysis are often written in natural language, resulting in 
ambiguous and contradictory specifications whose errors 
are only discovered late in the development process.  
 
 Run-time Execution Monitoring of formal 
specification assertions (REM) is class of methods of 
tracking the temporal behavior, often in the form of formal 
specification assertions, of an underlying application. REM 
methods range from simple print-statement logging 
methods to run-time tracking of complex formal 
requirements (e.g., written in temporal logic) for 
verification purposes. NASA used REM for the verification 
of flight code for the Deep Impact project [4]. In [5], we 
showed that the use of run-time monitoring and verification 
of temporal assertions, in tandem with rapid prototyping, 
helps debug the requirements and identify errors earlier in 
the design process. Recently, REM has been adopted by the 
U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System project as the 
primary verification method for the new ballistic missile 
battle manager because of its ability to scale, and its 
support for temporal assertions that include real-time and 
time series constraints [6]. 
 Formal specifications and lightweight formal methods 
help improve the clarity and precision of the requirements 
specification [7]. The process of specifying requirements 
formally enables developers to gain a deeper understanding 
of the system being specified, and to uncover requirements 
flaws, inconsistencies, ambiguities and incompletenesses 
[8]. Unfortunately, users of formal methods often discover, 
late in the development process, that their formal 
requirements are incorrect, greatly reducing the 
effectiveness of the formal method approach. 
 This paper is concerned with early development of 
correct formal specifications. The artifacts resulted in this 
process can be formally analyzed to check for requirements 
inconsistencies, or used to derive other properties of the 
specified system. The formal specifications also provide 
the basis for test automation as well as runtime fault 
detection and exception handling [9]. 
 The process described in this paper augments the 
current informal approaches to system-of-systems 
development by introducing temporal assertions to capture 
the safety-critical and mission-essential system 
requirements and runtime model checking to evaluate the 
system designs and implementation (Figure 1). The process 
starts with requirements expressed in natural language for a 
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 specific set of scenarios. Selected safety-critical and 
mission-essential requirements are translated into formal 
temporal assertions, which are evaluated against the 
scenarios using the DBRover temporal logic simulator [10] 
or the StateRover/JUnit statechart assertion simulator [11] 
for correctness. Correct assertions are input to the DBRover 
or StateRover code generator to generate executable timing 
specifications, which are then used to instrument the 
prototype system or target system for runtime monitoring 
and model checking.  
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Figure 1. Assertion use in system-of-systems development 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 provides an introduction to formal specifications in 
temporal logic and TLCharts. Section 3 presents an 
example that illustrates the creation and evaluation process 
for temporal assertions using the DBRover system. Section 
4 presents a discussion on the approach and draws some 
conclusions. 
2 Temporal Logic and TLCharts 
 Published REM methods typically use temporal logic 
as a specification language [12,13]. Temporal Logic is a 
special branch of modal logic that investigates the notion of 
time and order. This paper focuses on the use of temporal 
logic for specifying desired properties of discrete systems. 
Readers can refer to [14] for a variant of temporal logic for 
specifying properties of continuous systems.  
 Linear-time Temporal Logic (LTL) is an extension of 
propositional logic where, in addition to the well-known 
propositional logic operators, there are four future-time 
operators (◊-Eventually,  -Always, U-Until, Ο-Next) and 
four dual past-time operators. Pnueli [15] suggested using 
LTL for reasoning about concurrent programs. Since then, 
several researchers have used LTL to state and measure 
correctness of concurrent programs, protocols, and 
hardware (e.g., [16]). Metric Temporal Logic (MTL) was 
suggested by Chang, Pnueli, and Manna as a vehicle for the 
verification of real time systems [17]. MTL extends LTL 
by supporting the specification of relative-time and real-
time constraints. With MTL, all four LTL future-time 
operators can be characterized by relative-time and real-
time constraints specifying the duration of the temporal 
operator. Temporal Logic with Time Series constraints 
(MTLS) was suggested by Drusinsky as an extension of 
MTL which enables temporal specifications to provide 
assertions about time-series properties such as stability, 
monotonicity, and min-max values [12]. For example, the 
following automotive cruise control code contains a 
stability assertion (using embedded TemporalRover syntax 
[10]) requiring speed to be 5% stable while cruise is set and 
not changed: 
void cruise(boolean cruiseSet, boolean cruiseChange,  
        boolean cruiseOff, boolean cruiseIncr, int speed) { 
     … /* Cruise Controller functionality */ 
     /* TRBegin 
            TRAssert{Always ({cruiseSet} => 
                {speed*0.95 < speed’ &&  speed’ < speed*1.05}  
                     Until $speed$ {cruiseChange || cruiseOff})}  
           => {…} // user actions 
     TREnd */ 
 In the example speed is a temporal data variable, 
which is associated with the Until temporal operator. This 
association implies that every time the Until operator 
begins its evaluation, possibly in multiple instances (due to 
non-determinism), the speed value is sampled and 
preserved in the speed variable of this instance of the Until; 
this value is referred to as the pivot value for this Until 
node instance. Future speed values used by this particular 
evaluation of the Until statement are referred to using the 
prime notation, i.e., as speed’. Hence, if the speed value 
was 100Km/h when cruiseSet is true, then the pivot value 
for speed is 100, while every subsequent speed is referred 
to as speed’ and must be within 5% of the pivot speed 
value. 
 Note how speed is declared using the $speed$ 
notation to be a temporal data variable associated with the 
Until operator. This declaration indicates to the Temporal 
Rover that it should be sampling a pivot value from the 
environment in the first cycle of the Until operators 
lifecycle, and to refer to all subsequent samples of speed as 
speed’.  
 Drusinsky recently suggested TLCharts as hybrid of 
Harel Statecharts and temporal logic [18,19]. TLCharts 
visually and intuitively resemble Harel Statecharts while 
enabling non-determinism, negation and temporal-logic 
conditioned transitions. This is useful for specifying 
abstract non-deterministic temporal properties inside a 
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Figure 2. The TLChart specification for the  
infusion pump controls software 
 For example, Figure 2 shows the TLChart 
specification of the following behavior of an infusion pump 
control software: 
“Between every infusionBegin and an End-condition 
session, a keyPressed must be repeatedly sensed 
within any two-minute intervals or else an alarm must 
sound within 10 seconds and until keyPressed is 
sensed. Also, once the alarm sounds then the assertion 
has succeeded and no more alarms are permitted. The 
End-condition is defined infusionEnd being sensed 
until infusionBegin is sensed.” 
which can be formally written in MTL as: 
Always ( infusionBegin implies  
     ( (infusionBegin ∨ keyPressed ) implies 
          ( (Always ¬alarm) ∧  
             ( (Next Eventually≤120 keyPressed) 
               ∨ (¬keyPressed Until [120,130] (alarm  
                      Until (keyPressed ∧ Always ¬alarm)) 
                   )  
              ) 
           ) Until (infusionEnd  
                         Until (infusionBegin ∧ infusionEnd)) 
      ) 
    
 TLCharts provides a coherent uniform formalism for 
a hybrid of statecharts and temporal logic.  A TLChart 
input string represents a sequence of combinations of 
stimuli and corresponding system responses; for example, a 
sequence may contain keyPressed - generated by the 
environment, as well as alarm - a system generated 
response. The TLChart in Figure 2 describes legal 
(accepted) and illegal (rejected) sequences. From a 
verification standpoint, a rejected string means that the 
systems behavior does not comply with the specification, 
typically due to an incorrect system reaction to the input 
stimuli. This application of diagrams for specification 
rather than programming and design explains the existence 
of a sink state (the Error state), which does not typically 
exist in a design phase statechart. TLChart’s flavor of non-
determinism incorporates the specification of both good 
and bad computations with ambiguities resolved via a 
priority-based resolution scheme. Hence, a sequence of 
input events that ends up in both the Done state and the 
Error state in Figure 2 is a legal sequence because the 
Done state has higher priority than the Error state.  
 In [11] Drusinsky described the application of 
specification assertions to monitor and armor-plate 
statechart models. Using statechart assertions rather than 
temporal logic assertions to capture temporal assertions is 
most useful when the SoS, or some of its constituent 
subsystems, is modeled using UML statecharts. 
3 Temporal Assertion Development 
 Typically, formal specification assertions are created 
from a conceptual requirement as understood by the 
primary modeler. This requirement is often a derivative of 
the main scenario resulting from the Use Case analysis. 
When such an assertion is deployed it is often incorrect and 
does not work as intended. Possible reasons for an incorrect 
assertions are: 
1. Incorrect cognitive understanding of the requirement. 
This situation typically occurs when the requirement 
was driven from the use case’s main success scenario, 
with insufficient investigation of other scenarios. 
2. Incorrect translation of the requirement, as understood 
by the modeler, to natural language. 
3. Incorrect translation of the natural language 
specification to a formal specification. 
 Consequently, we propose the following iterative 
process for assertion development (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Iterative process for assertion development 
3.1  From Natural Language to MTL 
 Regardless of what formal notations or formal 
methods were used, UML modelers always start their 
requirements discovery process based on some scenarios 
involving the system and its environment, and express their 
understanding of the expected behavior or properties of the 
system informally with natural languages. For example, the 
modeler may come across a scenario where there is a need 
for the Missile Defense System Command and Control 
software to handle emergency requests. He expresses the 
requirements in English as follows: 
“When a request is active, then within one minute an 
acknowledgement should be generated and should be 
contiguously active until the request subsides.” 
 To translate the requirements into formal assertion, 
the modeler first introduces one predicate for each 
important concept (events/responses/guarded conditions) in 
the above English statement: 
Request = “a request is active” 
Ack = “an acknowledgement is generated and active” 
 Next, he uses timing diagrams to analyze the temporal 





Ack should remain false forever
 
Figure 4. Timing Diagram 
 Then, he expresses the conditions in MTL with the 
help of the DBRover syntax-directed rule editor (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. DBRover Rule Editor 
3.2 Validating the assertion via simulated 
scenarios 
 The effectiveness of lightweight formal methods in 
system-of-systems development depends heavily on the 
modeler’s ability to understand the requirements and to 
express them correctly as a formal specification. Past 
studies [20,21] showed that incorrect requirements 
specifications are the primary cause of major software 
faults. Hence, it is crucial for engineers to validate the 
correctness of the formal specifications as early as possible 
in the system-of-systems development process. In the 
proposed process, engineers can test their assertions against 
different scenarios (expressed as timing diagrams) using 
the standalone DBRover temporal rule simulator without 
writing any simulation code. 
 For example, assume that the English statement in 
Section 3.1 is formally written as: 
Always ( Request implies  
     Eventually≤1 min Ack Until Not Request ) 
 Figure 6 shows the DBRover temporal rule simulator 
set up for the first scenario. In this scenario, the Request 
predicate is set to true after 1 minute into the simulation 
and remains true for the next 90 seconds, and the Ack 
predicate is set to true less than one minute after Request 
becomes true, remains true for 30 seconds, and then turns 
false before Request becomes false. The modeler expects 
the assertion to fail because Ack becomes false before 
Request subsides. After setting the simulation parameters, 
the modeler presses the Simulate button (not shown in 
Figure 6) and a simulation will take place, displaying the 
output sequence in the output zone. The output shows that 
the assertion results in a permanent failure at the 10th cycle 
because Ack does not remain active until Request becomes 
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 false, which matches the intent of the natural language 
statement.  
 Figure 6. DBRover Temporal Rule Simulator 
 To test the correctness of the assertion, the modeler 
proceeds to create three more scenarios shown in Figure 7-
9.  
 
Figure 7. The second scenario 
 
 
Figure 8. The third scenario 
 
Figure 9. The fourth scenario 
 The second scenario (Figure 7) represents a typical 
case where Ack remains true until Request becomes false. 
The third scenario (Figure 8) represents the case consisting 
of multiple Request. The assertion results in a permanent 
failure at the 18th cycle because Ack fails to become active 
within 1 minute after Request becomes true the second 
time. The fourth scenario (Figure 9) represents the case 
with an unusually short Request interval. Since Request 
remains true for less than a minute, the condition 
“Eventually≤1 min Ack Until Not Request” becomes true once 
Request subsides in the 11th cycle, even though the rule is 
temporarily violated, due to the absence of an Ack, in the 
10th cycle. This phenomenon is due to the semantics of the 
temporal logic Until operator, where a Until b succeeds in 
the very first cycle when b becomes true. Not Request is 
true on cycle 11, and therefore Ack Until Not Request is 
true on cycle 11. The fourth scenario is clearly an example 
of a scenario not considered by the modeler when the 
requirement was conceived. It is possible that the cognitive 
expectation for this scenario is to see the assertion failing, 
as do all scenarios in which Ack subsides before Request. 
In this case, the formal specification needs to be adjusted 
accordingly. A possible new formal specification is 
therefore: 
Always ( Request implies ( 
  ( Eventually≤1 min Ack ) ∧  
  ( Always≤1 min Ack implies Ack Until Not Request ) ) 
)  
 Fig. 10 contains the simulation of this new assertion 
under the fourth scenario. Clearly, it fails on the 10th cycle. 
 
Figure 10. The revised assertion behavior  
4 Discussion and Conclusion 
 The use of formal specifications and lightweight 
formal methods can increase the level of dependability of 
the complex system-of-systems.  However, the 
effectiveness of such approach hinges on the ability to 
understand the system requirements correctly and to 
translate them into formal specifications accurately. We 
have shown a process for early development and validation 
of formal specifications.  The proposed process helps 
ensure the correctness of formal requirements per the 
modeler’s expectations, under a wide variety of scenarios. 
It is crucial to complete this phase early in the design 
process, to avoid a situation where incorrect formal 
specification assertions are deployed and used in later 
design phases, thereby slowing the overall development 
process.  
 The proposed process is made feasible with the help 
of the DBRover Temporal Rule Validation System. The 
DBRover temporal logic simulator allows modelers to set 
up the scenarios as simple timing diagrams. Modelers can 
use the DBRover GUI to specify the simulation length 
(counted in cycles) and the mapping of cycles to real-time 
(as real-time segments, where each segment has its own 
real-time unit and the number of such units in the segment). 
DBRover also supports time-series specification within the 
temporal rules by allowing the modelers to assign integer 
values to the temporal data variables. Simulation inputs and 
outputs for the current scenario are saved with their rules in 
the rule-set file, and simulation scenarios can be saved and 
loaded (exported and imported) to and from files using the 
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